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Abstract
We analyze the impact of the recent ﬁnancial market crisis on the Euro Overnight Index
Average (EONIA) and interbank market trading and assess the eﬀectiveness of the ECB
liquidity policy between 07/2007 - 08/2008. We extend the model of [QM06] by (i) incor-
porating the microstructure of the EONIA market including the ECB ﬁne-tuning operation
on the last day of the maintenance period (MP) and banks’ daily excess liquidity, (ii) giv-
ing insight into banks’ trading behavior characterized by an endogenous regime-switch and
suggesting an eﬃcient procedure to simulate the entire MP, and (iii) proposing a model for
market distortion due to lending constraints which lead to a bid-ask spread for the EO-
NIA rate. The model is calibrated by simulation ﬁtting daily EONIA rates and aggregate
liquidity measures observed between March 2004 and September 2008. Besides lending con-
straints we consider market segmentation and aggregate liquidity shocks as possible market
distortions in the crisis period. For a calibration cross-check and for estimating the timing
of the endogenous regime-switch we use panel data covering liquidity data of 82 Euro Area
commercial banks for the period 03/2003 - 07/2007. With the calibrated model the ECB
policy of liquidity frontloading is evaluated and compared with a reserve band system policy
similar to the Bank of England’s framework. We ﬁnd that liquidity frontloading is a small
scale central bank intervention which is capable of stabilizing interest rates in both friction-
less and distorted markets. Simulations suggest that without frontloading the EONIA would
have been, on average, 23 basis points above the policy rate (target); with frontloading, the
overnight rate is, on average, on target.
Keywords: liquidity management, open market operations, simulation, microstructure
JEL: E44, E52, G215
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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY 
This paper develops a theoretical framework to analyze the impact of the financial market crisis on the euro 
overnight interbank market, and to assess the effectiveness of the liquidity policy followed by the European 
Central Bank (ECB) during the August 2007 - September 2008 period. The paper has two main parts. 
In the first part we extend the seminal work of Quirós and Mendizábal (2006) in three dimensions. First, we 
generalize the model by casting it into a regime-switching model in which banks change liquidity 
management from a backward-looking liquidity shock correction mode into a forward-looking reserve 
management regime. Second, we explicitly incorporate the microstructure of the EONIA interbank market 
in our analysis. We model (i) the ECB policy of fine-tuning operations (i.e. provision or absorbtion of 
liquidity to mitigate liquidity imbalances) on the last day of the RMP, (ii) daily excess reserves held by 
banks as observed in aggregate liquidity data and (iii) weekend effect which seems to be rather influential 
during the financial turmoil and cause the EONIA to be U-shaped during the last week of the RMP. 
Consequently, we are able to explain and reproduce the empirically observed level and shape of the EONIA 
rates in the last week of the maintenance period. Third, in order to analyse the impact of the financial crisis 
on the euro interbank market we consider three types of market distortions: (1) credit rationing; (2) market 
segmentation; and (3) aggregate (negative) liquidity shocks.  
In the second part of the paper we calibrate the theoretical model and conduct simulation exercises in order 
to evaluate the impact of the liquidity policies of the ECB.  
The main conclusions from calibration are as follows: (1) market segmentation and lending constraints were 
not a significant feature of the Euro inter-bank overnight market before the crisis; (2) increasing liquidity 
volatility (idiosyncratic or aggregate) is neither necessary nor sufficient to generate the kind of market 
developments that were observed during the crisis; (3) to replicate the trading patterns observed during 
turmoil one needs a combination of increasing market segmentation and credit limits (rationing). 
With the calibrated model, the ECB's liquidity frontloading policy is evaluated and compared with a reserve 
band system policy similar to the Bank of England's framework (which we model following MacGorian 
(2005 a, b). Simulations suggest that without frontloading the overnight interest rate would have been, on 
average, 23 basis points above the policy rate (target); with frontloading and a fine-tuning operation on the 
last day of the maintenance period, the overnight rate is, on average, on target. Comparing the fine-tuning 
policy of the ECB to a reserve band system similar to the framework of the Bank of England we find that in 
case of liquidity frontloading both systems are equally able to anchor the overnight rate on the last day of 
the maintenance period where the latter seems to improve over the former in terms of higher average 
interbank market trading, lower transaction costs and lower EONIA standard deviation.  
There is a caveat in our analysis that should be borne in mind. With its liquidity policy the central bank 
fosters market activity and steers the overnight interest rate; however, the source of market distortions, 
captured in the model by market segmentation and lending constraints, is not addressed/impacted by the 
policy (i.e. are kept as exogenous parameters in the simulations). This can be justified only if those 
distortions have their roots in solvency, rather than liquidity problems. 6
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1 Introduction
The main goal of this paper is to develop a theoretical framework to analyze the impact of the
ﬁnancial market crisis on the euro overnight interbank market, and assess the eﬀectiveness of
the liquidity policy followed by the European Central Bank (ECB) during the August 2007 -
September 2008 period.
Whilst the unsecured euro interbank money market for maturities above one-week was
severely disrupted by the ﬁnancial market turmoil since its beginning, with vanishing volumes
and large spreads over secured sources of funding (e.g. the repo market), the unsecured overnight
interbank market saw an increase in transactions volumes, relatively low spreads and volatility
in the overnight interest rate (EONIA)1. Therefore, it is unclear whether market frictions were
pervasive (and if this was the case of what type) in the euro interbank market during turmoil.
The liquidity policy followed by the ECB during the August 2007 - September 2008 period,
labeled frontloading, consisted of shifting the timing of the supply of reﬁnancing, within the
reserve maintenance period, rather than changing the overall (average) size of funds available to
the banking system. Thus, it is somewhat puzzling how the ECB managed to steer the overnight
interest rate so close to the policy rate under turmoil (at an average zero spread) given the very
limited costs in terms of increased overnight interest rate volatility and frequency of ﬁne-tuning
operations. At that time, some commentators referred to the policy as “ﬂooding the market
with liquidity”, which is a misinterpretation of frontloading. This paper attempts to shed light
on the question of how frontloading works.
Our theoretical framework is based on the seminal work of Quir´ os and Mendiz´ abal (2006)
(herein [QM06]). In their framework banks are assumed to receive a liquidity shock at the end
of the day after the market for daily funds has closed (see Poole (1968) [Poo68]). Facing this
uncertainty about end-of-day liquidity shocks, banks manage their reserves by trading on the
interbank market so that the costs of borrowing (lending) liquidity shortages (surpluses) from
(to) the ECB are minimized.
In the ﬁrst part of the paper we extend [QM06] in several dimensions. Firstly, we generalize
the [QM06] model by casting it into a regime-switching model in which banks change liquidity
management from a backward-looking liquidity shock correction mode into a forward-looking
reserve management regime; in the model, banks follow the former mode in the early stages
of the reserve maintenance period (RMP) and switch to the latter mode towards its end, the
1EONIA is a quantity weighted average of the interest rate charged on overnight loans by a panel of Euro area
banks.7
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timing of the switch being endogenously determined. With this adjustment we are not forced
to limit our simulations to the 3 last trading days as in Gaspar, Quir´ os and Mendiz´ abal (2008)
(herein [GQM08]) to tackle the problem of curse of dimensionality but we are able to simulate
the entire maintenance period of approximately 28 days.
Secondly, we explicitly incorporate the microstructure of the EONIA interbank market in our
analysis. We model (i) the ECB policy of ﬁne-tuning operations (i.e. provision or absorbtion of
liquidity to mitigate liquidity imbalances) on the last day of the RMP, (ii) daily excess reserves
held by banks as observed in aggregate liquidity data and (iii) weekend eﬀect which seems to
be rather inﬂuential during the ﬁnancial turmoil and cause the EONIA to be U-shaped during
the last week of the RMP. Consequently, we are able to explain and reproduce the empirically
observed level and shape of the EONIA rates in the last week of the maintenance period.
Thirdly, in order to analyse the impact of the ﬁnancial crisis on the euro interbank market
we consider three types of market distortions: 1) credit rationing, 2) market segmentation
as implemented in [GQM08], and 3) aggregate (negative) liquidity shocks. The assumptions
underlying our model of credit rationing are motivated by the observation of increased banks’
overnight lending to the ECB. We assume that banks prefer the ECB as counterparty and only
partly lend to the interbank market. Thereby we show that banks’ lending constraints lead to
a bid-ask spread for the interbank market rate.
In the second part of the paper we calibrate the theoretical model and conduct simulation
exercises in order to evaluate the impact of the liquidity policies of the ECB. The model is
calibrated by a systematic search for a combination of parameters that minimize the Euclidian
distance of simulated versus realised values of the interest rate and liquidity aggregates. The
simulations are carried out along the lines suggested in [GQM08] and are conditional on aggre-
gate liquidity data observed between March 2004 and September 2008. For cross-checking the
calibration of the idiosyncratic liquidity shock volatility and for estimating the timing of the
regime-switch we use GMM methods and survival analysis, respectively, using individual bank’s
liquidity data collected for 82 Euro Area commercial banks covering the period March 2003 -
July 2007.
The main conclusions from calibration are as follows: 1) market segmentation and lending
constraints were not a signiﬁcant feature of the Euro inter-bank overnight market before the
crisis; 2) increasing liquidity volatility (idiosyncratic or aggregate) is neither necessary nor suf-
ﬁcient to generate the kind of market developments that were observed during the crisis; 3) to
replicate the trading patterns observed during turmoil one needs a combination of increasing8
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market segmentation and credit limits (rationing).
With the calibrated model, the ECB’s liquidity frontloading policy is evaluated and compared
with a reserve band system policy similar to the Bank of England’s framework (which we model
following MacGorian (2005 a, b) [Mac05b] and [Mac05a]). Simulations suggest that without
frontloading the overnight interest rate would have been, on average, 23 basis points above
the policy rate (target); with frontloading and a ﬁne-tuning operation on the last day of the
maintenance period, the overnight rate is, on average, on target. Comparing the ﬁne-tuning
policy of the ECB to a reserve band system similar to the framework of the Bank of England we
ﬁnd that in case of liquidity frontloading both systems are equally able to anchor the overnight
rate on the last day of the maintenance period where the latter seems to improve over the former
in terms of higher average interbank market trading, lower transaction costs and lower EONIA
standard deviation. However, if we assume that liquidity imbalances are not mitigated by
frontloading in the early stage of the maintenance period, compared to the ﬁne-tuning operation
system, the reserve band system is less eﬀective in steering interest rates towards the policy target
rate.
There is a caveat in our analysis that should be borne in mind. With its liquidity policy the
central bank fosters market activity and steers the overnight interest rate; however, the source of
market distortions, captured in the model by market segmentation and lending constraints, is not
addressed / impacted by the policy (i.e. are kept as exogenous parameters in the simulations).
This can be justiﬁed only if those distortions have their roots in solvency, rather than liquidity
problems.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the main features of the
operational framework of the Eurosystem and presents stylized facts about liquidity management
by banks in the euro area, the euro overnight interbank market and the open market operations
of the ECB, before and after August 2007. The empirical evidence provides the motivation for
our theoretical framework. Section 3 reviews the [QM06] model and introduces the notation. In
Section 4 we present the regime-switching model. In Section 5 we adapt the model of [QM06]
to incorporate banks’ demand for excess reserves and the ECB’s ﬁne-tuning operation on the
last day of the maintenance period. In Section 6 we discuss aggregate liquidity shocks and
introduce lending constraints in the model. The principles of frontloading are discussed in
Section 7. Model calibration is presented in Section 8 including the estimation of the timing of the
regime switch and the distribution of individual bank’s liquidity shocks; we discuss alternative
scenarios based on simulating diﬀerent combinations of liquidity shocks, lending constraints and9
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market segmentation both for the pre-crisis and crisis periods and compare the simulation results
with observed aggregate values. In Section 9 we simulate and evaluate diﬀerent open market
operations policies and diﬀerent degrees of frontloading. The main conclusions are presented in
Section 10.
2 Operational Framework and Stylised facts
2.1 Main features of the operational framework
The operational framework of the Eurosystem contains three main elements: minimum reserve
requirements with averaging provision, standing facilities, and open market operations. Below
we brieﬂy describe each of these components.
Reserve requirements contribute to stabilizing money market interest rates. Euro area banks
have to keep minimum reserves (ie current accounts) with National Central Banks (NCB).
Reserves must be kept on average over a maintenance period which has approximately one
month duration. Required reserves are remunerated - linked to the marginal rate of the Main
Reﬁnancing Operations (MROs). Current account holdings beyond the minimum requirement
are not remunerated (excess reserves).
Additionally, there are two types of standing facilities, one providing liquidity (against col-
lateral), which is the marginal lending facility and another, absorbing liquidity, which is the
deposit facility. Both are overnight facilities taken at the discretion of the banks, and, in gen-
eral, there are no limits set by the ECB to their recourses by banks. Standing facilities have
penalty rates: marginal lending +100 basis points above the Minimum Bid Rate (MBR, policy
rate) and deposit facility -100 basis points below the MBR. These two rates set a corridor for
the interbank market overnight interest rate.
There are three main types of open market operations:
1. The Main Reﬁnancing Operations (MROs) are liquidity providing reverse transactions,
with one-week maturity, conducted every week.
2. The Longer Term Reﬁnancing Operations (LTROs) are liquidity providing reverse trans-
actions, with three-month maturity, conducted once a month.2
3. Fine Tuning Operations (FTOs) provide or absorb liquidity. They have neither ﬁxed
2During the crisis the ECB introduced other term reﬁnancing operations: Supplementary Longer Term Reﬁ-
nancing Operations (SLTRO) with 3-month, 6-month and 12-month maturities; and a Special Term Reﬁnancing
Operation (Maintenance Period Operation - MPO) with maturity equal to the length of the reserve maintenance
period, with allotment and settlement on its ﬁrst day.10
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frequency nor maturity. Since 2005 the ECB conducts (almost) systematically an FTO on
the last day of each reserve maintenance period.
2.2 Stylized Facts
This section presents stylised facts about banks’ liquidity management in the euro area, the euro
overnight interbank market and the open market operations of the ECB, before and after August
2007.3 The aim of the section is to provide empirical motivation for the theoretical framework
and the extensions to the [QM06] model that will be introduced in the following sections.
Our sample of daily aggregate data includes both tranquil and turbulent times. The begin-
ning of the pre-crisis sample is March 2004, which coincides with the introduction of several
changes to the operational framework of the Eurosystem. One change relevant for the modelling
framework is the execution of ﬁne-tuning operations on the last day of the maintenance period,
i.e. the provision or absorbtion of liquidity to mitigate liquidity imbalances. While the frame-
work for FTOs was setup in March 2004, these operations have been carried out with higher
frequency since February 2005 (see [ECB06]). To the extent that ﬁne-tuning operations are
anticipated by market participants the overnight interest rate is expected to settle close to the
key policy rate4 on the last day of the reserve maintenance period. However, demand for excess
reserves by (some) banks introduces an asymmetry in the ﬁne-tuning operation which makes its
implementation complicated. The following sections will deal with this diﬃculty.
The crisis period in our sample starts on 9 August 2007, when the French bank BNP Paribas
closed three investment funds with exposure to US sub-prime loans. The sample ends on 15
September 2008, when the investment bank Lehman Brothers collapsed and the ECB switched
to ﬁxed rate tenders with full allotment. The analysis of the second “wave” of ﬁnancial market
turbulence is outside the scope of the present paper. The pre-crisis (crisis) period covers 33 (14)
maintenance periods.
Open market operations During the crisis period the ECB followed a frontloading liq-
uidity policy, i.e. additional liquidity was provided via allotments above benchmark5 during the
early stage of the reserve maintenance period with the surplus gradually reduced throughout
the reserve maintenance period, either through allotments below benchmark or via liquidity
draining ﬁne-tuning operations.
3Further information on the operational framework of the Eurosystem is presented in the Appendix.
4The key policy rate of the ECB is the minimum bid rate in the weekly Main Reﬁnancing Operations.
5Benchmark allotment is deﬁned as the amount of reﬁnancing that allows banks to fulﬁl their reserve require-
ments smoothly (linearly) over the reserve maintenance period.11
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Figure 5 plots the average outstanding volumes of reﬁnancing operations over the last 28 days
of the reserve maintenance period, normalised by the minimum reserve requirement, and the
empirical distribution of ﬁne-tuning operation volumes on the last day of the reserve maintenance
period. In the pre-crisis period the provision of liquidity via MROs and LTROs was stable
throughout the reserve maintenance period; the outstanding reﬁnancing via MROs was higher
than the outstanding longer term reﬁnancing via LTROs (see Figure 5a, b). There were no
FTOs except on the last day of the maintenance period (see Figure 5c); on the last day of
the maintenance period FTO volumes were very small and showed a symmetrical distribution
centered around zero (see Figure 5d). In total there were 11 liquidity providing FTOs and 14
liquidity absorbing FTOs.
In the crisis period liquidity frontloading was implemented by high and decreasing tender
amounts at the MROs. At the same time, and in contrast to the pre-crisis period, the share
of liquidity provision via MROs became lower than the share of liquidity provision via LTROs;
there was a shift towards longer-term reﬁnancing by the ECB in order to ﬁll the funding gaps
of banks that were opened by the drying-up of market term funding after the crisis (see Figure
5e, f). During the crisis FTOs were conducted also in the early part of the reserve maintenance
period and were on average liquidity draining operations (see Figure 5g). On the last day of the
maintenance period liquidity has been drained by ﬁne-tuning operations with volumes centered
around -10% of the MRR (see Figure 5h). Hence, the ECB’s open market operations policy in
the crisis period can be characterized by liquidity frontloading through MROs during the entire
maintenance period and liquidity absorbtion via FTOs during the reserve maintenance period.
Current accounts and reserve fulﬁlment path by banks Figure 6 shows evidence on
banks’ current accounts and information on their reserve fulﬁlment path over the last 28 days
in the maintenance period. In the pre-crisis period banks fulﬁlled their reserve requirement in a
smooth way; the deﬁciency6 was linearly reduced over the maintenance period and the current
accounts were stable, slightly above 100% of the minimum reserve requirements reﬂecting average
excess reserves of approximately 5-8 bps per MRR (see Figure 6a, b). Daily liquidity conditions
were stable throughout the maintenance period with only minor daily imbalances emerging
(Figure 6c).
In the crisis period the deﬁciency deviated from the linear fulﬁlment path due to the front-
loading policy of the ECB. In fact, banks’ current accounts decreased on average from 110%
6Deﬁciency at a certain day is the remaining reserve requirement to be met until the end of the maintenance
period.12
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of MRR at the beginning of the maintenance period down to 80% of the MRR at the end of
the maintenance period (Figure 6e). The deﬁciency decreased faster in the early stage of the
maintenance period compared to the pre-crisis period (Figure 6f). As a result, daily liquidity
conditions varied signiﬁcantly throughout the maintenance period with sizable daily imbalances
emerging (Figure 6g). The mean aggregate accumulated reserve surplus on the last day of the
maintenance period was non-zero and centered around 14.5 % (12%) of the MRR in the pre-crisis
(crisis) period.
EONIA Figure 7 plots the average EONIA and the total interbank market trading volume
over the last 28 days of the maintenance period in the pre-crisis and the crisis period. In the pre-
crisis period, EONIA stayed almost constant at approximately 7-8 bps above the MBR most of
the time with increasing volatility towards the end of the maintenance period; on the last day of
the maintenance period EONIA converged towards the MBR level (Figure 7a) thus suggesting a
small deviation from the strict martingale hypothesis. In the pre-crisis period interbank market
trading volume exhibited a marked increasing pattern over the maintenance period (Figure 7c).
In the crisis period interbank market rates show higher volatility with the EONIA spread
(over the MBR) moving around zero. Around weekends and towards the last days of the mainte-
nance period EONIA showed a marked U-shape pattern with a minimum on the penultimate day
(Figure 7b). Comparing the trading volume of pre-crisis and crisis period one observes a slightly
higher (lower) trading volume in the crisis period at the beginning (end) of the maintenance
period reﬂecting again the frontloading policy of the ECB (Figure 7d).
Standing facilities Figure 8 plots the recourses to the marginal lending facility (MLF)
and the deposit facility (DF). During the crisis period banks’ recourses to the deposit facility
were higher than in the pre-crisis period (Figure 8a, b), while the recourses to the marginal
lending facility remained approximately unchanged or were even lower during the crisis period
(Figure 8c, d).
Modelling challenges posed by the empirical evidence It is noticeable that in both
the pre-crisis and in the crisis period the EONIA is close to the MBR on the last day of the
maintenance period; however, it shows a slight declining trend during the maintenance period,
and a U-shape pattern towards its end. Simultaneously we observe an aggregate accumulated
reserve surplus of 14.5 % (12%) of the MRR and mean FTO liquidity absorbtion of 0% (10%)
of the MRR on the last day of the maintenance period in the pre-crisis (crisis) period. These13
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observations cannot be explained by the [QM06] model.
Moreover, neither [QM06] nor [GQM08] allow for lending constraints which was a widespread
feature of the interbank market during the crisis period, as reported by banks. Further and
possibly related to the issue of lending constraints, the [QM06]/[GQM08] framework does not
take into account the empirical observation that banks’ lending to the ECB deposit facility
increased in the crisis period, while banks’ borrowing from the ECB lending facility remained
unchanged.
In the following sections we present a theoretical framework capable of explaining the stylized
facts and incorporating a variety of market distortions.
3 The [QM06] model of banks’ liquidity management
In this section we review the seminal [QM06] model of the market for daily funds in the Euro
area. The model incorporates the ECB standing facilities which are an important feature of the
Eurosystem operational framework and provides the backbone for our own model.
The model considers n banks and assumes that the interbank market is frictionless. A bank






t denotes the bank’s current account
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t is the deﬁciency, i.e. the remaining reserve requirement on
day t of the maintenance period. Each bank trades the amount b
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t in the interbank market,
where b
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t > 0) corresponds to borrowing (lending) funds. After the interbank market
closes each bank j receives a liquidity shock λ
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t, which we interpret as resulting from imperfect
monitoring of outﬂows and inﬂows of funds. The liquidity shocks are assumed to follow a
probability distribution F; more speciﬁcally we consider a normal distribution with mean μ and
standard deviation σ, i.e. λ
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t ∼ N(μ,σ). The j-th bank’s current account and deﬁciency are
















respectively (see Figure 1). A bank must fulﬁl its reserve requirement on average over a main-
tenance period; therefore d
j
T+1 = 0, where T denotes the last day of the maintenance period.14
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Figure 1: Intra-day schedule
In the [QM06] model the interbank market rate is determined by the costs of using the
central bank’s standing facilities, i.e. the marginal lending rate il and the deposit rate id for
borrowing and lending funds from and to the central bank, respectively.
Overnight overdrafts are not allowed by the central bank; thus, if a bank faces an overdraft on




t < 0, it has to borrow
from the marginal lending facility of the central bank at the marginal lending rate il. If a bank







it is said to be locked-in. In this case the bank lends the surplus to the central bank at the
deposit rate id. On the last day t = T of the maintenance period the bank must borrow from









il. If it is locked-in, it lends to the central bank at the deposit rate id. Given that, compared
to interbank market trading, transacting with the central bank involves penalty rates, i.e. it is
costly for a bank to fulﬁl its reserve requirement ahead of time or to miss it on the last day.
On the last day of the maintenance period, t = T,the solution of the model gives the optimal
trading b
j
T and market clearing rate iT which are equal to, respectively
b
j

















n are the aggregate deﬁciency per bank and the aggregate
current account per bank on day t, respectively (see [QM06]).
Liquidity conditions are said to be balanced on the last day of the reserve maintenance period,
when DT = AT. If F() is symmetric around zero, i.e. λ
j
t ∼ N(0,σ), balanced liquidity conditions,
F(0) = 1/2, imply that, iT = id +( il − id)/2, i.e. the equilibrium level of the overnight interest
rate is the mid-point of the interest rate corridor set by the rates on the standing facilities (il
and id). Therefore, in order to steer the overnight interest rate the central bank may choose to
set the rates on the standing facilities symmetrically around the policy rate (i∗) given that the
market equilibrium and the ”targeted” policy levels of the overnight interest rate would coincide
(iT = i∗), at least on the last day of the reserve maintenance period, provided that it ends with15
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1247
October 2010
balanced liquidity conditions.
For days t<T−1 prior to the penultimate day of the maintenance period there is no closed





































































t if t<T . (4)
The intuition for equation 3 is as follows: In equilibrium, banks equate the marginal revenue
of lending funds (i
j
t, the market rate) to the expected marginal cost. The expected marginal





t) which may happen if, for example, the bank borrows ”too little” in the
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t = 0); and the cost of carrying one unit of reserve deﬁciency into the future,
which is measured by the third term on the r.h.s. of equation 3. Further intuition for this
dynamic cost term can be gained by looking at the solution for the penultimate day in the
reserve maintenance period, T − 1.
As shown in [QM06], the rate i
j




















































According to equation (6) the equilibrium overnight rate on the penultimate day of the
reserve maintenance period (T − 1) is a weighted average of three rates: il with weight equal




T−1); id with weight equal to the






T−1); and E[iT], the16
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expected rate on the last day of the maintenance period, with a weight equal to the probability
that the bank is neither locked-in nor faces an overdraft on day T −1. Thus, the cost of carrying
one unit of reserve deﬁciency into the last day of the reserve maintenance period is measured
by E[iT], conditional on the bank being neither locked-in nor face an overdraft on day T − 1.










T−1) = 1, then i
j
T−1 = E[iT]; if
balanced liquidity conditions are expected for day T,E[iT]=i∗, and then, i
j
T−1 = i∗; under these
special conditions the central bank is able to steer the overnight interest rate at the policy rate
level also on the penultimate day of the reserve maintenance period. However, these conditions
are, in practice, diﬃcult to verify and may not extend backwards in time before T −1, as it will
be elaborated in the following sections.
4 Regime-switching model of reserve management by banks
In this section we introduce the main building blocks of our theoretical framework. We start
with the observation that there is no analytical solution to the model of [QM06] for all but the
last two days of the reserve maintenance period. Therefore, solutions for days t<T− 1h a v e
to be obtained through numerical approximation techniques as done also in [GQM08]. Still,
simulation of a single maintenance period with more than three days is hard to get without
further simpliﬁcations. In fact, solving the model for maintenance periods of 28 days, like the
average length of a reserve maintenance period in the euro area, is too time consuming. Thus, in
the early stages of the reserve maintenance period, treasurers at commercial banks are unlikely
to manage their daily trading in the interbank market by taking the entire reserve maintenance
period into account.
As a simplifying assumption [QM06] suggest to impose the martingale property for the
overnight interest rate in the model, which simpliﬁes the simulations:
it = E[it+1]. (7)
However, assuming the martingale property during the early stage of the reserve maintenance
period leaves the distribution of interbank market trading b
j
t indeterminate. This, of course, is
not an appealing feature of the model especially if one is interested in explaining trading volumes.
In fact, even if the indeterminacy of lending volumes might be acceptable during tranquil times,
during turmoil the distribution of trading volumes becomes an important driver of interbank
market dynamics. Our modelling approach allows pinning-down both rates and volumes and,
thus, is suitable for analysing the interbank market under both calm and turbulent conditions.17
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We simplify equation (6) by noting that, given the size of the reserve requirement in the euro








t) ≈ 0. (8)
Thus, from equation (6) and equation (8) we see that in the early stages of the reserve mainte-
nance period a bank determines its interbank market trading according to
i
j





i.e. the rate i
j





of having an overdraft; it is not dependent on the deﬁciency. Thus, management of no-overdrafts
can be considered as the primary reason for interbank market trading in the early stages of the
reserve maintenance period.
Rearranging equation (9) gives the optimal interbank market trading b
j













If the interbank market is cleared at the rate i
j



















t = it and from equation (10) and equation (11) the supply of funds b
j
t can be calculated as
b
j
t = −At + a
j
t. (12)
Therefore in the early stage of the maintenance period a bank trades the deviation of its current
account a
j
t from the market’s average current account At. If the bank’s previous current account
is at about the level of the current market’s average, i.e. if At ≈ a
j
t−1, the bank will borrow
funds if it received a negative shock on the previous day and will lend if a positive shock was
received, i.e. the bank follows an error (liquidity shock) correction mechanism. Furthermore, if











































1 = a1; in a frictionless market the bank’s interbank borrowing or lending is independent
of the liquidity shocks of the other banks and only depends on the own shocks received in the
past.
















which means that the deﬁciency is reduced by the average current account in the market At−1
and the own shock λ
j
t−1 experienced on the previous day.
Inserting equation (12) into equation (9) gives the equilibrium rate which is equal to
it = E[it+1]+( il − E[it+1])F(−At). (18)
The equilibrium overnight rate depends only on the average current account At and the expected
rate on the next day E[it+1]. Note that as the market rate is bounded from above by the marginal
facility rate, il, the second term on the right hand side of equation (18) must be non-negative,
which suggests that the martingale hypothesis might not be veriﬁed in the early stages of the
reserve maintenance period; in fact the overnight rate might be expected to decline over the
reserve maintenance period (it ≥ E[it+1]), which is consistent with the evidence presented in
Section 2.
Compared to the models [QM06] and [GQM08], we diﬀerentiate between two regimes. Regime
I represents the early stage of the maintenance period when the probability of getting locked-in is
zero and the backward-looking liquidity shock correction model described in this section applies.
Under this ﬁrst regime, banks only manage overdrafts and overlook the deﬁciency. Under the
ﬁrst regime rates and trading are determined by equations (9) and (12), respectively. However,






t) >  ,
a switch takes place into regime II where funds supplied b
j
t and the optimal overnight interest
rate i
j
t are determined by the forward-looking equations proposed by [QM06] and reviewed in
Section 3. The timing of the regime switch will be discussed in Section 8.
5 Fine-tuning operation on t = T and excess reserves
In the model of [QM06] banks expect the overnight rate to be equal to the policy rate on the
last day of the maintenance period if liquidity is balanced, i.e. if average deﬁciency is equal
to the average current account. However, in Section 2 which reports stylized facts in the Euro
area we observe rates near the policy rate along with liquidity surpluses indicating that the
banking system accumulates excess reserves of about 14.5% (12.0%) of the daily average reserve19
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requirement in the pre-crisis (crisis) period without increasing interbank market lending pressure
on the last day of the maintenance period. Moreover, starting in February 2005 with higher
frequency, the ECB carries out a ﬁne-tuning operation on the last day of the maintenance
period, which mitigates liquidity deviations from the seemingly targeted excess reserves. Both
targeted excess reserves and ﬁne-tuning operations are not modelled in [QM06]. We address this
shortcoming by explicitly taking into account the ECB’s ﬁne-tuning operation f on the last day
of the maintenance period, t = T, and the targeted (accumulated) excess reserves, S of banks.
5.1 Excess Reserves
Excess reserves are not remunerated and therefore should be zero given the alternative oﬀered
to banks to place any surplus at the deposit facility, which is remunerated. However, in the Eu-
rosystem recourse to the deposit facility is not automatic; it must be requested by the bank. The
empirical fact that there are excess reserves in the euro area can be explained if the opportunity
cost of holding a (small) liquidity surplus is lower than the marginal cost of paying the treasurer
to transfer excess funds to the deposit facility (see [BCMHW06]). For small institutions, which
have low reserve requirements, this may indeed be the case.


























T = AT − DT. (20)
Based on the argument in [BCMHW06] we assume that banks keep daily excess reserves
which accumulate up to the average excess reserves S on the last day of the maintenance period.
Furthermore, we assume that the bank trades b
j
t − X in the interbank market, i.e. banks trade
the additional amount −X to keep daily excess reserves as buﬀer. In this case it can be shown
in analogy to the derivation in [QM06] that the equilibrium interbank market rate on the last
day of the maintenance period is given by
iT = id +( il − id)F(S − DT + AT). (21)
where on the last day X does not enter the equation as no overdrafts are managed on this day.
For days t<Tprior to the last day of the maintenance period the formulas for the i-th bank’s20
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−iT if t = T























t if t<T . (23)
Correspondingly the interbank market trading in regime I is given by
b
j
t = −At + a
j
t + X (24)
(cf equation (12)). Hence, if X<0 banks borrow more and lend less in order to achieve excess
liquidity. For the remaining theoretical discussion we assume X = 0 in regime I and only
consider the impact of targeted excess reserves on the last day of the maintenance period.
5.2 Fine-tuning operation
According to equation (2) interbank market rates increase with decreasing liquidity surplus. To
mitigate such eﬀects of liquidity imbalances on interbank market rates the ECB carries out a
ﬁne-tuning operation on the last day of the reserve maintenance period, when the averaging


















Figure 2: Intra-day schedule on the last day of the maintenance period
We assume that the ECB determines the ﬁne-tuning operation as a function h of the ag-
gregate liquidity surplus AT − DT after trading and recourses to the standing facilities and the
accumulated excess reserves S targeted by banks on t = T, i.e.
f = h(AT,D T,S) (25)
where we assume that in case of a liquidity surplus f<0 and in a liquidly deﬁcit f>0. The
amount S represents the willingness of banks to keep excess reserves. Hence S is equal to the
accumulated excess reserves held per bank during the maintenance period.21
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Liquidity is balanced if f = 0. In case of liquidity imbalances we assume that through the
ﬁne-tuning operation f the central bank provides or drains liquidity at the rate if which we
assume to be equal to the MBR.7
If f<0, i.e. in case of a liquidity surplus, the costs c
j
T of a bank using the ECB’s standing
facilities at t = T are given by borrowing at the marginal lending facility at the rate il up to








T <S , or by lending at the
rate if up to an amount of −f and lending the remaining surplus at the rate id such that the
targeted accumulated excess reserves S are met. The optimal trading b
j
T is determined by8
i
j












T + S − f). (26)
In case of a liquidity deﬁcit, i.e. if f>0, the costs c
j
T are calculated as the cost of borrowing,
where up to the amount f the rate if applies and for the remaining amount of borrowing the
rate il has to be paid. The costs of lending are given by the rate id. Both borrowing and lending
banks are assumed to target accumulated excess reserves of S. The corresponding ﬁrst order
condition for the optimal interbank market trading b
j
T is given by
i
j
T = id +( il − if)F(d
j










T + S). (27)
If the rate if is set equal to the MBR, i.e. if if = il+id
2 , then the interbank rate for both liquidity
providing (f>0) and liquidity absorbing (f<0) ﬁne-tuning operations is equal to
i
j















T + S)). (28)
If f is evenly distributed across all banks, we can derive a formula for the equilibrium trading
amount b
j
T by the following approach. We start from the model of [QM06] which gives the market
clearing trading at the rate iT as
b
j





Inserting into equation (28) gives
iT = i
j
T = id +
il − id
2
(F(S − f + DT − AT)+F(S + DT − AT)). (30)
As f and S are equal for all banks, the rate i
j
T is equal for all banks and therefore equal to the
equilibrium rate iT. Therefore, the amount of market trading in case of ﬁne-tuning is the same
7This is a modelling simpliﬁcation. In practice, the ECB has provided (drained) liquidity in FTOs using
variable rate tender procedures with a minimum (maximum) bid rate equal to the policy rate. The marginal rate
in FTOs has been close though not equal to the minimum bid rate.
8See Appendix Section B for the derivation of this ﬁrst order condition.22
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as in the case of no ﬁne-tuning operation. The diﬀerence due to ﬁne-tuning is the equilibrium
rate which is higher (lower) in case of a liquidity deﬁcit f>0 (surplus f<0).
Moreover, from equation (30) it follows that if the central bank targets an interbank market
rate equal to the MBR, i.e. iT = id+il
2 , then the amount of the ﬁne-tuning operation has to be
determined such that
F(S − f + DT − AT)+F(S + DT − AT)=1 . (31)
By assumption the distribution F fulﬁlls the condition 1 − F(x)=F(−x); thus we obtain
f =2 ( S + DT − AT) (32)
i.e. the central bank has to provide (drain) twice the banks’ perceived liquidity surplus (deﬁcit)
S + DT − AT in order to reach an interbank market equilibrium rate equal to the MBR on the
last day of the maintenance period. Note that when the maintenance period enters its last day
with current accounts suﬃciently large, i.e. when S + DT = AT, the ﬁne-tuning volume is null,
f = 0. The empirical evidence reviewed in Section 2 suggests that this situation corresponded
to the average case before the crisis.
Figure 9 illustrates the relation between the ﬁne-tuning operation and the accumulated daily
reserve surplus on the last day of the reserve maintenance period.
As an approximation the FTO volume can be calculated as the diﬀerence between the accu-
mulated reserve surplus observed in the morning of the last day of the maintenance period (before
trading) and the mean accumulated reserve surplus in the evening (after trading) amounting to
S =1 4 .5% (S = 12%) of the MRR in the pre-crisis (crisis) period. Considering both liquid-
ity providing and absorbing FTOs, simple OLS regressions for the amount of the ﬁne-tuning
operation f give:
fpre−crisis ≈− 0.01741 + 1.05912(S + DT − AT) (33)
and
fcrisis ≈− 0.00326 + 0.597753(S + DT − AT) (34)
for the pre-crisis and crisis period, respectively, where the coeﬃcients are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero at the 1% level. Furthermore, the regression slopes diﬀer signiﬁcantly from 2 at the
1% level (see equation (32)) giving empirical evidence that ECB practise of determining the
amount of the FTO deviates from the rule derived above.23
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6 Modeling the impact of the ﬁnancial crisis
To analyse the impact of the ﬁnancial market crisis on the functioning of the overnight interbank
market, the model presented in the previous sections has to be reﬁned. We follow the strategy
of introducing deviations from and/or constraints on optimality. First, we consider a negative
aggregate liquidity shock to the supply of funds in the overnight interbank market. The liquidity
shock is assumed to follow a distribution N(μ,σ) where μ<0. The impact of the aggregate
liquidity shock on interbank market trading and overnight interest rate is discussed in Section
6.2. Second, we introduce constraints on market lending such that banks lend part of their
liquidity surpluses to the central bank (see Section 6.3). In both cases, i.e. lending constraints
and negative liquidity shocks, we additionally analyze diﬀerent degrees of market segmentation
(Section 6.1) by simulation (see Section 8.2).
Counterpart risk and uncertainty about own funding needs may be two reasons for banks
to lend sub-optimally under turmoil. Both factors also may contribute to market segmentation,
which may have been reinforced, after the crisis, due to the segmented (national) nature of
banking supervision and ﬁnancial stability responsibilities, thereby potentially hindering the
cross-border ﬂow of liquidity.
6.1 Market segmentation
We model market segmentation as suggested by [GQM08]. We group the n banks into smaller
groups with size s, n/s being the number of bank groups and allow trading among banks only
within each group. Consequently, the shocks within a group do not necessarily sum up to












t = 0. The aggregate group shock μs
t can be positive or negative leading to lower
or higher group rates, respectively. In the overall market the cross-section dispersion of the
interbank market rates increases due to market segmentation (see [GQM08]).
6.2 Aggregate liquidity shock
In this section we reﬁne the model by introducing aggregate liquidity shocks. Here we consider
only regime I; the impact of aggregate liquidity shocks in regime II is simulated and discussed




t the liquidity shock with mean μ>0 bank j receives,
where λ
j0










t = −n · μ. (35)24
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= A1 − μ · t. (38)
Inserting into equation (12), the supply of funds in the interbank market and the equilibrium
rate in the early stage of the maintenance period, respectively, are given by
b
j
t = −A1 + μ · (t − 1) + a
j












it = E[it+1]+( il − E[it+1])F(−A1 + μ · (t − 1)) (40)
Comparing equation (18) and equation (40) one observes that as a consequence of a negative
aggregate liquidity shock, the equilibrium overnight interest rate will be higher as the probability
of an overdraft increases. According to equation (9) the bank trades the amount b
j
t so that
the deviation of its current account from the market average is zero. As all banks experience
the aggregate shock, the deviation of a single current account from the market average is not
inﬂuenced by the aggregate shock. Therefore, the distribution of the trading b
j
t in the interbank
market is not aﬀected by the negative aggregate liquidity shock.
6.3 Lending constraints
The introduction of lending constraints in the model is motivated by the empirical observation of
successful liquidity absorbing ﬁne-tuning operations in the early stage of the reserve maintenance
period and banks’ use of the deposit facility after turmoil (see Figure 5 and Figure 8). We assume
that banks supply only part of their optimal unconstrained lending to the interbank market and
lend the remainder to the ECB by going to the deposit facility and by participating in liquidity
absorbing FTOs.
On the last day of the maintenance period t = T we assume that banks with a liquidity
surplus lend b
j
Tl with lending constraint 0 <l<1 to the interbank market at the interbank
market rate iT and b
j
T(1−l) to the ECB by taking recourse to the deposit facility at deposit rate25
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Hence the equilibrium lending interest rate is higher than the equilibrium borrowing rate (dis-
continuity at b
j
T = 0) generating a bid-ask spread given by
spread
j
T =( il − id)

















The spread is positively dependent on the width of the interest rate corridor il − id; on the
volume of the liquidity absorbing ﬁne-tuning operations f<0; on the targeted excess reserves





Tl) for diﬀerent levels of lending constraint l as well as the spread
j
T is illustrated in an
example in Figure 3.























Figure 3: Demand curve for id = 3%, il = 5%, D
j
T = 100, A
j




On days t<T, we assume that the banks lend b
j
Tl to the interbank market at rate iT and
the remaining lending b
j
T(1−l) to the ECB at a rate equal to the weighted average of the FTO
rate and the deposit rate id. As a proxy we assume that this average is equal to the interbank








T(1 − l) − c(T) (41)
where c(T) are the costs of using the standing facilities in case of an overdraft or in case of getting locked-in (see
Section 3 and Section 5). The optimal borrowing/lending b
j
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market rate, which can be observed to ﬂuctuate around the MBR in the crisis period. The

































where l∗ =( 1− l)/l and nl is the number of lending banks.
From Figure 3 we see that lending constraints lead to an increase in the overnight interest
rate on the last day of the maintenance period. In regime I, the equilibrium rate is given by










t > 0. Therefore, in both regimes lending constraints lead to higher interest rates.
The impact of lending constraints on the interbank market if markets are segmented is
simulated in Section 8.2.
7 How does frontloading work?
As shown in the previous section, market frictions such as aggregate shocks or lending constraints
increase interbank market rates. A central bank may wish to intervene through liquidity injec-
tions in order to steer the overnight interest rate towards the policy rate. The frontloading
policy implemented by the ECB during the market turmoil in 2007/2008 consists of providing
the additionally required liquidity in the early stage of the maintenance period and to adjust
for liquidity imbalances at the end of the maintenance period. In this section we sketch how
liquidity frontloading works. Our results rely on the regime-switching model and on the model
for the ﬁne-tuning operation on the last day of the maintenance period.
For illustration purposes let us consider a simpliﬁed model where the regime switch takes
place on the last day of the maintenance period. Furthermore, assume that the liquidity imbal-
ance m = S + DT − AT on the last day T is perfectly projected in regime I. We compare two
scenarios:
Frontloading projected liquidity imbalances We assume that the central bank homo-
geneously frontloads the liquidity m>0 to each bank in regime I, i.e. due to the frontloading
m the current account of bank j and the aggregate current account change to
a
j
t + m (46)
10See Appendix Section C for the detailed derivation.27
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t + m, (47)




t = −At − m + a
j
t + m = −At + at. (48)
i.e. interbank market trading remains unaﬀected by frontloading liquidity as the deviations of
banks’ current accounts a
j
t + m to the aggregate current account At + m do not change.
However, frontloading decreases equilibrium interest rates in regime I (cf. equation(18))
down to
it = E[it+1]+( il − E[it+1])F(−At − m). (49)
Furthermore, the average deﬁciency DT is reduced as in interbank market equilibrium the indi-
















t − At − m − λ
j
t. (50)
Consequently, on the last day of the maintenance period, the required amount of the ﬁne-tuning
operation leading to interbank market rates equal the MBR is zero, i.e.
f =2 ( S + DT − m − AT)=2 ( S + DT − (S + DT − AT) − AT)=0 . (51)
No frontloading In an alternative scenario, assume that the central bank does not front-
load liquidity in regime I, i.e. m=0. The amount of trading
b
j
t = −At + at (52)
is the same as in the front-loading case (compare to equation 48) as in regime I the level
of trading does not depend on the absolute level of the banks’ current accounts a
j
t but their
deviation from the aggregate current account At. This observation that front-loading has no
impact on the amount of interbank market trading in the early stage of the maintenance period
(regime I) reﬂects our insight that in regime I banks only manage past liquidity shocks and not
their deﬁciencies.
On the other hand, interest rates depend on the absolute level of the aggregate current
account At (see equation (12)) and therefore are higher in the no-frontloading case. Hence, we
conclude that frontloading taking place in regime I has an impact on the interest rate level but
not on the trading volume.28
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Furthermore, in case of no-frontloading the ﬁnal ﬁne-tuning operation is given by
f =2 ( S + DT − AT)=2 m. (53)
i.e. it requires twice as much funds to reach the MBR on t = T as compared to the frontloading
scenario.
Policy implications We can draw two conclusion from this simple example.
First, the frontloading policy of the ECB leads to a decrease, and stabilizing eﬀect, in the
overnight interest rate. In the pre-crisis period in regime I the interbank market rate is given
by equation (18), i.e. by
i
pre−crisis
t = E[it+1]+( il − E[it+1])F(−At). (54)
As shown in section 6 in turmoil periods this relation changes to
i
crisis−liquidityshock
t = E[it+1]+( il − E[it+1])F(−A1 + μ · (t − 1)) (55)
in case of an aggregate liquidity shocks μ and to
i
crisis−lendingconstraints








in case of lending constraints l. In both cases interest rates increase due to the corresponding
market imperfection. If there is no further provision of liquidity in regime I, i.e. no frontloading,






as expressed in equation (55) and equation (56), respectively, interest rates go up in regime
I. Furthermore, the formulas for interest rates in regime I also show that besides aggregate
liquidity entering the term F(.), the interest rate is also aﬀected by expected future rates E[it+1].
Therefore, a stabilizing policy has to consider both interest rate expectations and the current
liquidity situation. The combined strategy of frontloading liquidity in regime I and eliminating
remaining liquidity imbalances on t = T via a ﬁne-tuning operation, such that iT = MBR,
seems to be a suitable strategy to stabilize both eﬀects.
Second, controlling expected rates is more eﬃcient with frontloading. As shown in the
simpliﬁed example above, frontloading excess reserves is more eﬃcient in a ”quantity” sense
(e.g. smaller-scale central bank intervention) than providing excess reserves solely on the last
day of the maintenance period. Moreover, this eﬃciency argument suggests the implementation
of FTOs not only on t = T but also during the maintenance period (as increasingly observed29
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in the crisis period).11 In practice, implementing frontloading along the lines suggested by the
simpliﬁed theoretical model is diﬃcult because the central bank would have to forecast/know
the future liquidity imbalance m on the last day of the maintenance period. With increasing
information in the course of the maintenance period forecasting errors about the imbalance on
the lsat day will be reduced. The eﬃciency argument advises to correct forecasting errors in
regime I (through ﬁne-tuning operations or regular operations) when banks do not manage their
deﬁciencies and only correct for liquidity shocks.
The arguments developed above are based on a very simpliﬁed model. Thus, in the next
sections we consider a more realistic set-up which can be studied using a simulation framework.
8 Calibration of the Model Parameters
For simulating the model discussed in the previous section we estimate the following parameters
for the pre-crisis and the crisis period:
• the average point of time at which banks switch from backward-looking liquidity shock
correction to forward-looking reserve management
• the distribution parameters for the idiosyncratic liquidity shock λ
j
t ∼ N(μ,σ)
• the parameter for banks’ lending constraint l
• the degree of market segmentation s.
The calibration is done in two main steps.12 Firstly, in Section 8.1, we estimate the timing of
the regime-switch using survival analysis. For this purpose we use data on the daily end-of-day
current accounts cuac
j
t, minimum reserve requirements mrr
j
t and net recourse to the standing
facilities netr
j
t of j =1 ,...,82 euro area banks, covering the period between March 2003 and
July 2007.13
Secondly, with the timing of the regime-switch ﬁxed, we simulate the model with diﬀerent
combinations of parameters and market distortions, in order to ﬁnd a combination of parameter
values that minimises the Euclidian distance between simulated and realised values of EONIA
11We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out the importance of FTOs during the maintenance period
during the crisis period.
12The models discussed in the previous section rely on the assumption that the distribution of the liquid-
ity shocks F is homogeneous across banks. To guarantee this assumption in the presence of diﬀerently sized







normalization is discussed in greater detail in the appendix.
13From the original sample of 95 banks we excluded subsidiaries of international investment banks which show
a pattern of liquidity management which is not comparable to the management of the majority of banks in the
sample.30
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and aggregate liquidity ﬁgures (See Section 8.2). The simulations are carried out along the lines
suggested in [GQM08] and are conditional on aggregate liquidity data observed between March
2004 and September 2008.
The plausibility of the calibrated variance of the (idiosyncratic) liquidity shock distribution
is cross-checked with an estimate of the volatility parameter using GMM methods applied to
the panel bank data (see Appendix D).
8.1 Timing of the regime-switch
In section 4 we mentioned that the regime switch should depend on the (magnitude of the)








t). When this probability is below a certain
threshold,  , each bank is assumed to manage only overdrafts, i.e. to keep, bt + at > 0, but not
the deﬁciency, i.e. banks are in regime I. When the threshold is reached, the regime is switched
and banks start to manage both deﬁciency and overdrafts.






t directly, the panel data set contains the end-of-day
current account cuac
j




























Hence, for the estimation of the probability of a bank getting locked-in we do not need to
measure (unobservable) liquidity shocks or interbank market trading; in fact, all that is needed
are the observable end-of-day current account cuac
j
t and deﬁciency d
j
t, which is included in our
data set. The deﬁciency d
j










where the net recourses to the standing facilities netr
j
t are taken into account. d
j
0 = n · mrr
j
t
with n equal to the number of days in the maintenance period and mrr
j
t is the minimum reserve
requirement in this period.









t < 0) (59)
We approximate the cumulative distribution function P(cuac
j
t <X ) by an empirical cumu-
lative distribution function ˆ P(X) ≈ P(cuac
j
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where I(.) is an indicator function equaling one if the stated condition is fulﬁlled, otherwise
being zero. The summary statistics of the distribution of the observed current accounts cuac
j
t
is given in Table 1.
For the estimation of the timing of the regime switch we apply survival analysis. We calculate
the probability of a bank getting locked-in ˆ P(d
j
t) and compare it to a threshold  . For diﬀerent
choices of the threshold   we estimate the survival function
S( )t = Prob[(1 − ˆ P(d
j
t)) <  ] (61)
where S( )t is the probability that at time t the probability of getting locked-in is below a
threshold   , i.e. that the regime switch has not occurred up to time t. Time is measured in days
until the end of the maintenance period. Depending on the magnitude of the deﬁciency and the
current account distribution some banks may, and others may not, switch regime by the end
of the maintenance period. Therefore, we apply the Kaplan-Meier estimator for nonparametric
estimation of S(t) in a right-censored problem.
Table 2 and Figure 10 plot the survival function for large, medium and small sized banks if (a)
  = 0 and (b)   = ˆ P(0); i.e. banks start to manage their deﬁciency either when the probability
of getting locked-in is (a) greater than zero or (b) greater than the probability of an overdraft.
Table 2 compares the values of the survival function for the last week of the maintenance period,
while Figure 10 plots the survival function over the entire maintenance period.
First of all, we observe that for diﬀerent bank sizes the survival function has diﬀerent values
(see Figure 10). The log-rank test rejects the null hypothesis of equality of the survival functions
of large, medium and small sized banks at the 1% signiﬁcance level (this result is omitted in
Table 2).
Figure 10 shows at which point of time the survival function deviates from 1. If   = 0 the ﬁrst
trading day when the survival function is below 1 is on the last Thursday, second last Monday
and second last Thursday in the maintenance period for large, medium and small sized banks,
respectively. If   is set equal to the probability of an overdraft, the survival function starts to
decline around one week before the end of the maintenance period for small and medium sized
banks and approximately on the last Friday for large sized banks. In Table 2 we observe that
on the last Friday of the MP around 60% of all banks are not locked in. Furthermore, we note
that the last weekend in the maintenance period causes a jump in the regime switch probability.













Working Paper Series No 1247
October 2010







Friday,0). This weekend eﬀect is especially relevant for the last weekend in the maintenance
period: while on the last Friday in the maintenance period approximately 60% of all banks
are not locked-in, on Monday, after the weekend, only 9% of all banks are not locked-in. This
observation is in line with [GQM08] who show that the distribution of the EONIA on the last
two to three days of the maintenance period diﬀers from the distribution on the previous days
of the maintenance period. For our simulation study we assume that the regime switch is on
the last Monday of the MP for all banks.
8.2 Simulations
With the timing of the regime switch ﬁxed around the last weekend in the reserve maintenance
period, we systematically simulate diﬀerent combinations of parameter values and scenarios of
market frictions (lending constraints, market segmentation, aggregate liquidity shocks) in order
to choose which one reproduces most closely, in simulations, the main empirical features and
stylized facts of the euro overnight interbank market during the August 2007 - September 2008
period. The simulation design is similar to the one suggested by [GQM08].14
We simulate the last 8 days of the maintenance period from Tuesday to Tuesday. This period
covers 6 trading days and one weekend. For consideration of the latter we apply equation (62)
for updating the deﬁciency on Monday. In this period the outstanding reﬁnancing (MROs and
LTROs) provided to the banks by the ECB is constant and, thus, the EONIA can be assumed to
be determined only by banks’ liquidity management according to the adapted model discussed
in the ﬁrst part of this paper. We apply the regime switching model described in Section 3
and Section 4 and assume that on the ﬁrst 4 trading days (Tuesday to Friday) banks apply the
backward-looking error (liquidity shock) correction model, while on the last two days (Monday
and Tuesday) the supply of funds in the interbank market is determined by the forward-looking
model15.
We simulate 1000 maintenance periods. For the pre-crisis simulation we apply equation (12)
for regime I. For regime II the integrals in equation (22) and equation (23) are approximated
by Monte Carlo simulation with 500 simulation paths. A description of the algorithm applied
for solving the stochastic dynamic programming problem at t<Tin regime 2 is described in
14However [GQM08] simulate only two days of active trading and neglect the last weekend eﬀect.
15Note that this setting reﬂects our calibration ﬁndings based on our individual current account data set which
only covers the pre-crisis period. In turmoil periods the average point of time for banks’ regime-switch may take
place earlier due to the frontloading of liquidity and banks’ willingness to bearing the cost of early locking-in. In
the aggregate data shown in Figure 8a and 8b we observe increased usage of the deposit facility in the crisis period
indicating higher locking-in in turmoil periods. A deeper investigation of banks’ regime-switching behaviour in
turmoil times is left to future research due to lack of data.33
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the Appendix in Section F. To capture the eﬀects of lending constraints, market segmentation
and aggregate liquidity shocks in turmoil periods we apply the model modiﬁcations discussed in
Section 6.
We consider n = 60 banks and initialize the state space by setting the banks’ deﬁciencies
d
j
T−7, current accounts a
j
T−7 and the targeted reserve surplus equal to empirically observed
averages DT−7, AT−7 and S. We observe an average (adjusted) deﬁciency of DT−7 = 784
(DT−7 = 723.5), an average current account of AT−7 = 101 (AT−7 =9 6 .5) and an accumulated
reserve surplus of S =1 4 .5( S =1 2 .0) in the pre-crisis (crisis) period (quantities are given as
multiples of the average minimum reserve requirement times 100).
By starting the simulations conditional on the aggregate deﬁciency DT−7 and the average
current account AT−7, the central bank’s liquidity frontloading is implicitly taken into account
in the simulation. The higher the fraction
DT−7
AT−7, the lower the amount of frontloading. Hence, in
the pre-crisis period frontloading is given by 784
101 =7 .76 and in the crisis period by 723.5
96.5 =7 .50.
The interest rate corridor of the standing facilities is set at id = 3% and il = 5%, the level of
ECB policy rates during most of the sample period. The amount of the ﬁne-tuning operation f
on the last day t = T is endogenously determined according to, f = S − DT + AT (see Figure
9).
We carry out simulations assuming diﬀerent parameter values for the liquidity shock distri-
bution λ
j
t ∼ N(μ,σ), the lending constraint l and the degree of market segmentation s. For both
the crisis and pre-crisis period we consider three assumptions for the liquidity shock volatility
σ ∈{ 30,45,55}. This range covers the empirically estimated individual liquidity shock volatil-




t = nμ, i.e. in case of no
aggregate shocks, μ = 0, the impact of liquidity shocks on the aggregate current account AT is
zero. For details on the generation of the liquidity shocks see [GQM08]. Furthermore, we test
two scenarios of diﬀerent degree of market segmentation s. We assume one scenario without
frictions, i.e. s = 60, and a scenario with market segmentation with 3 segments consisting of
s =6 0 /3 = 20 banks.
For each scenario we calculate the per capita deﬁciencies Dt, average end-of-day current
accounts At (excluding FTOs and after trading and receiving shocks) and the average amount
of trading |B|t =
 n
j=1 |bt| as multiples of the minimum reserve requirement times 100 on the last
5 trading days of the maintenance period. Additionally we report the EONIA spread (EONIA
- MBR) on each simulated trading day. For the last day of the maintenance period we report
the lending/borrowing amount of the ﬁne-tuning operation and if l<1 also the bid-ask spread34
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spreadT.
For the determination of the EONIA on each simulated trading day we approximate the
oﬃcial calculation method by deﬁning the simulated EONIA as the quantity-weighted average
interest rate for all lending banks where the rate is weighted by the bank’s amount of lending.
As the EONIA is determined based on the reporting of unsecured lending transactions in the
interbank market of banks with the highest business volumes in the Euro money markets, we
focus on simulating the liquidity management of large size banks. The following scenarios are
considered:
• Pre-crisis scenarios with and without market segmentation: DT−7 = 780, AT−7 = 101,
S =1 4 .5
• Crisis scenarios with and without market segmentation and increased frontloading: DT−7 =
723.5, AT−7 =9 6 .5, S = 12.
• Crisis scenarios with and without market segmentation and negative aggregate shocks:
DT−7 = 723.5, AT−7 =9 6 .5, S = 12 analyzing the impact of an aggregate shock of
μ = −0.5.
• Crisis scenarios with and without market segmentation and lending constraints. DT−7 =
723.5, AT−7 =9 6 .5, S = 12) and with lending constraints l =0 .97 and 0.99, respectively.
Table 3 reports the Euclidian distance between simulated and observed average EONIA
spread, variation in the EONIA spread across maintenance-periods, shape of EONIA spread,
and liquidity characteristics. For calibration we select the combination of parameters that
minimises the Euclidian distance between simulated and observed values; the observed and
simulated averages for the EONIA spread are illustrated in Figure 11.
The combination of parameters that minimises the choice criteria before the crisis is, s =6 0
(no market segmentation), σ = 45, and no lending constraint l =1 .
Therefore the simulations suggest that market segmentation and lending constraints were
not a signiﬁcant feature of the Euro inter-bank overnight market before the crisis. Moreover, the
smooth declining path of EONIA observed towards the end of the reserve maintenance period,
which documents a small deviation from the strong martingale hypothesis, can be explained in
our model by the liquidity management regime-switch that occurs just after the last weekend in
the period; it is only from that day onwards that banks start focusing on end-of-period conditions
managing their reserve deﬁciency in a forward-looking manner.35
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The combination of parameters that minimises the choice criterion EONIA spread during
the crisis is, s = 20 (market segmentation), σ = 45, and lending constraint l =0 .99, which gives
(marginally) better results than those obtained with l =0 .97.16 However, given that the latter
parameter gives lower Euclidian distances for the liquidity criterion, we chose l =0 .97 for the
calibration exercise.
It is interesting to note that simulations with the aggregate shock alone generate the third
lowest criterion for the EONIA spread and the lowest criterion for the liquidity characteristics,
with unchanged idiosyncratic volatility parameter from pre-crisis level (σ = 45). However,
the aggregate liquidity shock alone does not allow reproducing in simulations the shape of the
EONIA spread during the crisis; it is market segmentation that generates in most simulations a
U-shape pattern for the EONIA spread.
Overall, the simulations suggest that a combination of market segmentation and lending
constraints is needed in order for the model to replicate the observed patterns of trading in the
interbank market during the crisis. The simulations suggest, somewhat surprisingly, that neither
aggregate liquidity shocks nor increasing volatility of idiosyncratic liquidity shocks were the main
features of the impact of the ﬁnancial market crisis in the interbank overnight market as they
under-perform compared to a combination of market segmentation and liquidity constraints in
reproducing the shape and level of the EONIA spread during the crisis. Of course, in practice,
it might be the case that all factors were present during the crisis.
9 Policy evaluation
In this section we evaluate diﬀerent policies of providing and absorbing liquidity in the crisis
period. For this purpose we simulate the last 8 days of 1000 maintenance periods conditional
on diﬀerent values for aggregate deﬁciency and current account combinations at the simulation
starting point. Based on the results presented in the previous section, we calibrate liquidity
shocks to be distributed according to λ
j
t ∼ N(0,45). Furthermore, we calibrate market segmen-
tation at s = 20 (3 banking groups) and lending constraints of l =0 .97. Based on the empirical
evidence banks’ targeted accumulated excess reserves are set at S = 12. The marginal lending
rate (deposit rate) is assumed to be il =5 %( id = 3%).
For policy evaluation we compare two diﬀerent degrees of frontloading and two diﬀerent
systems of providing or absorbing liquidity on the last day of the maintenance period:
16The plausibility of the calibrated variance of the (idiosyncratic) liquidity shock distribution is cross-checked
with an estimate of the volatility parameter using GMM methods applied to the panel bank data (see Appendix
D).36
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• We measure the degree of frontloading by the ratio of aggregate deﬁciency and aggregate
current account observed after the last MRO in the maintenance period and implement
diﬀerent frontloading policies by starting the simulations conditional on diﬀerent ratios
of aggregate deﬁciency DT−7 and current account AT−7 . We compare the aggregate
frontloading policy observed in the crisis period (AT−7 =9 6 .5/DT−7 = 723.5), with a
scenario generated by approximating DT−7 and AT−7 without frontloading. For generating
the latter scenario we run the shock correction model for the ﬁrst 15 trading days of the
maintenance period (including weekends) with lending constraints l =0 .97 and market
segmentation s = 20 assuming no change of medium or long term reﬁnancing via MRO
or LTRO. As a result we obtain the ratio AT−7 =9 6 .5/DT−7 = 807 for the case of no
frontloading in the crisis period.
• We compare the ECB’s ﬁne-tuning operation policy on the last day of the maintenance
period with the reserve band system of the Bank of England discussed in Appendix E.
For the simulation the reserve band is set to rb = 28.17 The volume of the ﬁne-tuning
operation f on the last day t = T is endogenously determined according to the estimated
ECB rule (illustrated in Figure 9), i.e. f ≈ S − DT + AT.
For each policy we calculate diﬀerent criteria capturing the eﬀectiveness and the eﬃciency
of the diﬀerent policies. The former measures how the policy performs in keeping EONIA close
to the policy target (eg EONIA spread close to zero); the latter compare the policies by their
degree of interference with market functioning.
• EONIA predictability: we calculate the EONIA spread over the MBR on the last day of
the maintenance period and the time-series volatility of the EONIA over the last 5 trading
days. A policy is considered to be more eﬀective, if it leads to lower EONIA spread on the
last day of the maintenance period, and lower EONIA standard deviation.
• Transaction costs: due to lending constraints banks trade at a bid-ask spread on the
interbank market. The bid-ask spread is calculated according to equation (44). A policy
is considered to be more eﬀective, if it leads to a narrower bid-ask spread.
• Interbank market activity measured in average (absolute) trading volume during the
last two days of the maintenance period. We only consider the trading volume in regime
II as in regime I the average trading volume is independent of the applied policy as banks
17rb =2 8=0 .01 × MRR × days in the RMP.37
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only correct for liquidity shocks and do not manage reserves. A policy is considered to be
more eﬃcient, if it leads to larger trading volumes.
• Liquidity Provision: by calculating the liquidity provided/absorbed on the last day of
the maintenance period by the central bank and by comparing the total amount of liquidity
provision including the amount of frontloaded liquidity we focus on the supply side of each
policy. A policy is considered to be more eﬃcient, if it requires less funds to be provided
to the market by the central bank.
Figure 12 plots the EONIA over the last 5 trading days for the four evaluated policies. Table
6 compares the benchmark policy deﬁned to be frontloading plus ﬁne-tuning operation on t=T
as observed in the crisis period to policies with and without frontloading combined with reserve
band system or ﬁne-tuning operation on the last day of the maintenance period. For each
quality criterion the average value over all simulated maintenance periods and the diﬀerence to
the benchmark policy is given.18
First we analyze the case when there is no frontloading in the crisis period scenario. In
this case the entire liquidity (approx. 61 % of the MRR) is provided on the last day of the
maintenance period (see Table 6), where there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between ﬁne-tuning
operation and reserve band system (not reported in the table). The total liquidity provided
exceeds the ”observed frontloading” case by about 15-16 % points. Furthermore, if there was
no frontloading in the crisis period the EONIA would have been approximately 23 bps higher
on the last day of the maintenance period (in case of a ﬁne-tuning operation on the last day
of the maintenance period). The impact of no frontloading would have been even higher if the
(symmetric) reserve band system was adopted instead of the ﬁne-tuning operation. In this case
the EONIA would have been approximately 38 bps higher. Moreover, no frontloading leads to
higher EONIA time-series standard deviation and higher bid-ask spread which is approximately
0.7-1.2 basis points higher compared to the observed frontloading scenarios (see Table 6 and
Figure 12). Interbank market trading activity measured by average trading volume is also lower
if no frontloading is carried out. Depending on whether a FTO or the reserve band system
is adopted on the last day of the maintenance period, the interbank market trading is 4-9
percentage points lower than in the observed frontloading scenario. Hence, we conclude that
irrespective of whether a ﬁne-tuning operation is conducted or a reserve band system is in place,
on the last day of the maintenance period, if there is no liquidity provided in the early stage of
18We refer to quality of policy rather than welfare analysis because the latter is associated with general equi-
librium, whereas the scope of ours is partial (dis)equilibrium analysis.38
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the maintenance period and if markets are not frictionless, liquidity provision only on the last
day of the maintenance period leads to higher total liquidity provision by the central bank. This
conﬁrms the results of Section 7 for markets with frictions. Furthermore, and more importantly,
even with increased liquidity provision in case of no frontloading, the EONIA, transaction costs
and the interbank market activity cannot be steered as close to the targets as it is in the case of
frontloading. For instance, considering the EONIA spread, even with liquidity provision of 61%
of the MRR the EONIA spread cannot be steered towards zero due to market segmentation and
lending constraints.
Comparing the ﬁne-tuning operation and the reserve band system in case of frontloading as
observed, we note that the reserve band produces slightly better results for all quality criteria
(statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence). The reserve band system absorbs slightly more liquidity
on the last day of the maintenance period (-3.3% of the MRR compared to -3.0% in case of
a FTO), leading to a more eﬃcient use of liquidity, higher average interbank market trading,
lower transaction costs and lower EONIA standard deviation. Nevertheless, both the ﬁne-tuning
operation and the reserve band lead to EONIA spreads which are not statistically diﬀerent from
zero on the last day of the maintenance period.
10 Conclusions
In the ﬁrst part of this paper we extend the [QM06] model of the euro overnight interbank
market in three directions. First, we incorporate the microstructure of the European interbank
market to capture the level and the shape of the Euro interbank market rate. Second, we
propose a regime switching model with endogenous regime switch which allows to simulate the
entire maintenance period without facing the problem of curse of dimensionality. Moreover, the
model provides theoretical insights into the trading behavior of banks in the early stage of the
maintenance period. Thirdly, we propose a model for an interbank market which is distorted
by credit rationing and show that lending constraints of banks lead to a bid-ask spread on the
interbank market.
In the second part we use our model to study the impact of the market turmoil on the euro
overnight interbank market by allowing for market segmentation, lenders’ credit lines (credit
rationing), and aggregate liquidity shocks. The main conclusion of the calibration and subse-
quent simulations is that increasing liquidity volatility (idiosyncratic or aggregate) is neither
necessary nor suﬃcient to generate the kind of market developments that were observed during
the crisis. In fact, for the model to replicate the kind of interbank trading patterns observed39
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during turmoil what is needed is a combination of (a) increasing market segmentation, which
leads to U-shape pattern of the EONIA and increased EONIA volatility; and (b) credit limits
(rationing) which increase the level of the EONIA.
Using panel data of 82 Euro Area commercial banks covering the period March 2003 - July
2007 we ﬁnd that (i) the average idiosyncratic liquidity shock volatility is around 45% of the
minimum reserve requirement and that (ii) banks on average switch from a backward-looking
liquidity shock correction regime to a forward-looking reserve management regime around the
last weekend of the maintenance period. The latter result gives one explanation to the obser-
vation in [GQM08] that the EONIA distribution on the last three days is diﬀerent from the
EONIA distribution on previous days of the maintenance period.
Based on simulations of market segmentation and lending constraints, we evaluate ECB’s
liquidity frontloading policy and compare it with a reserve band system policy similar to the Bank
of England’s framework. The simulation results suggest that without frontloading the overnight
interest rate would have been, on average, 23 basis points above the policy rate (target); with
frontloading and a ﬁne-tuning operation on the last day of the maintenance period, the overnight
rate is, on average, on target. Therefore, our theoretical result that frontloading is an eﬃcient
tool to stabilize interest rates, is also conﬁrmed for distorted markets. Comparing the ﬁne-
tuning policy of the ECB to a reserve band system similar to the framework of the Bank of
England we ﬁnd that while both are equally able to anchor the overnight rate on the last day of
the maintenance period, the latter seems to improve over the former in terms of higher average
interbank market trading, lower transaction costs and lower EONIA standard deviation.
There is an additional insight provided by our analysis. With frontloading the central bank
fosters market activity and steers the overnight interest rate; however, the source of market
distortions, captured in the model by market segmentation and lending constraints, are not
addressed / impacted by the policy as they are kept as exogenous parameters in the simulations.
This only can be justiﬁed if those distortions have their roots in solvency, rather than liquidity
problems. To the extent that our model captures the main features of the impact of the ﬁnancial
market turmoil on the functioning of the interbank market, it highlights as well the limits to
central bank policy focused on liquidity management.40
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A Minimum reserve requirement adjustment
To ensure the assumption that the distribution for the liquidity shocks F is homogeneous across
banks in the presence of diﬀerent sized banks in our sample we consider liquidity shocks which
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If the interbank market is cleared at the rate i
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B Optimization problem for the ﬁne-tuning operation
If f<0, i.e. in case of a liquidity surplus, the costs c
j
T of a bank using the ECB’s standing
facilities at t = T are given by borrowing at the marginal lending facility at the rate il up to








T <S , or by lending at the
19For instance, if F and F
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rate if up to an amount of −f and lending the remaining surplus at the rate id such that the
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where I(x) is an indicator function equalling 1 if the condition x is true, and 0 otherwise. The
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In case of a liquidity deﬁcit, i.e. if f>0, the costs c
j
T are calculated as the cost of borrowing,
where up to the amount f the rate if applies and for the remaining amount of borrowing the
rate il has to be paid. The costs of lending are given by the rate id. Both borrowing and lending
banks are assumed to target accumulated excess reserves of S. Then, the costs are given by
c
j
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C Inter-bank market trading in case of lending constraints
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D Liquidity Shock Volatility
For cross-checking the validity of the calibrated idiosyncratic shock volatility parameter we
estimate the volatility parameter directly applying GMM to the panel bank data covering the
period March 2003 - July 2007.
The i-th bank’s observable current account cuaci
t after trading during regime I and receiving






Guided by the theory derived in Section 4 we model interbank market trading by
bi
t = −At + βai
t +  t. (70)
This speciﬁcation is motivated by the observation of banks targeting liquidity excess reserves,
where X =( β − 1)ai +   (see Section 5).
Then the current account is given by
cuaci
t =( 1− β)ai
t + At + λi
t +  t
Inserting equation (70) into equation (69) and taking ﬁrst diﬀerences leads to
Δcuaci
t+1 = At+1 − At + λi
t+1 − λi
t +( 1− β)(ai
t+1 − ai
t)+Δ  t+1 (71)
= At+1 − At + λi
t+1 − βλi
t +Δ  t+1 (72)
For model estimation we lean on the idea of covariance estimation for panel data proposed by
[HM82]. We proceed in two steps: we ﬁrst run OLS regressions on Δcuac
j
t to ﬁlter MRO and
LTRO changes and to extract the corresponding residuals Δcuaci
t which we consider to contain
the pure information about liquidity shocks λi
t. In a second step we estimate the covariance
structure of the residuals Δcuaci
t with a parametric function of market segmentation s, the
trading parameter β, and shock liquidity variance σ2
λ.










t +Δ  t+1 (73)
where we used the fact that ai
t+1 − ai
t = λi




n . We additionally consider banks
to have diﬀerent idiosyncratic shock volatilities. If shock volatility varies with bank size, we
estimate σλ,large, σλ,medium and σλ,small for large, medium and small banks, respectively. By the
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where we assumed that E[ tλt]=0




t = α + βMROΔMROt + βLTROΔLTROt +Δ cuaci
t. (77)
The residuals Δcuaci
t of the time series regressions of each banks’ current account changes are
taken as input for the GMM estimation. Distribution moments, normality test and autocorre-
lation for the residuals Δcuaci
t are given in Table 4.
In Table 5 we report the results of the GMM estimation of the model parameters. We ﬁnd
the idiosyncratic volatility to be around 42% for large banks, 38% for medium sized banks and
36% for small banks. The J-test indicates that the moment conditions speciﬁed above ﬁt the
data. Note that market segmentation has almost no impact on the estimation results. The main
conclusion is that the calibrated volatility parameter, σ = 45, is close to the value estimated for
the large banks in the sample.
E Reserve band system
Within the reserve band system of the Bank of England, each bank is not required to meet
the reserve requirements exactly but only within a band width of ±1% of the MRR. If the
reserves are within the band they are remunerated by the rate ir equaling the oﬃcial interest
rate. [Mac05b] and [Mac05a] provide formulas for the optimal interbank market trading in the
[QM06] model. We model a similar policy where we assume that the remuneration rate ir equals
the rate il+id
2 and that the band width is equal to
rb =0 .01 · MRR· days in maintenance period (78)
i.e. equal to the accumulated maximum excess reserves remunerated at ir. Then by adapting
the formulas of [Mac05b] and [Mac05a] the interbank rate and trading on the last day of the46
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maintenance period are determined by
i
j
T = id +
il − id
2













if the deﬁciency of bank j is outside the reserve band, and by
i
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if the deﬁciency of bank j is inside the reserve band (if the bank is inside the band it has to




T > 0 otherwise it has to borrow funds at the
marginal lending facility). Figure 4 compares the demand curves of the ﬁne-tuning operation
and the reserve band system in an example. In this example, if a bank in a reserve band system
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Figure 4: Demand curve for id = 3%, il = 5%, D
j
T = 100, A
j




ends within the reserve band on the last day of the maintenance period, optimal lending is at
a lower rate than in the ﬁne-tuning operation system. For banks with deﬁciency outside the
band, the individual lending and borrowing rates in a reserve band system are bounded from
below and above by rates resulting from liquidity providing and liquidity absorbing ﬁne-tuning
operations, respectively, in a non-reserve band system.
F Description of the Solution Algorithm









T−1,E(iT)) with j =1 ,...,n has to be solved to obtain the optimal47
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T−1 for each bank such that the market is cleared. The calculation requires to calculate
the expected value of the rate iT = f(bT−1,b T,a T−1,d T−1,λ T−1) where bT−1, bT, dT and aT are
n-dimensional vectors of trading, deﬁciency and current accounts at T and T − 1, respectively.
For solving this problem we ﬁx a rate ˆ iT and determine the market clearing trading vector
ˆ bT−1 for iT = ˆ iT. Conditional on ˆ bT−1 we calculate the rate iT. We repeat this procedure
systematically until the diﬀerence ˆ iT − iT < tol where tol is a tolerance level.
For the determination of market clearing trading bt we generate a grid where the entry b(k,j)
gives for bank j =1 ,...,n the optimal trading b
j
T−1 at the individual optimal rate ik = i
j
T−1
with ik = {id,i d + il−id
m−1,...,il − il−id
m−1,i l}. The optimal trading is given by b
j





h,j)|, i.e. where the market imbalance is lowest. Although this procedure
is computational expensive it allows to consider trading constraints in the determination of the
optimal market clearing market vector. An example for a trading restriction is the constraint






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































G Figures and Tables49
ECB





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































WE FR TU TH MO WE FR TU TH MO

































WE FR TU TH MO WE FR TU TH MO













































































Figure 7: EONIA spread over the minimum bid rate (MBR) and trading volume over the
minimum reserve requirements (MRR) during the last 28 days of the maintenance period between
November 2004 and September 2008. Mean (straight line) and mean ± 1 standard deviation
(dotted line) of 33 and 14 maintenance period in the pre-crisis and crisis period, respectively,
are plotted.51
ECB








































































































































































Figure 8: Usage of standing facilities (deposit facility (DF) and marginal lending facility (MLF))
in multiples of the minimum reserve requirement (MRR) during the last 28 days of the mainte-
nance period between November 2004 and September 2008. Mean (straight line) and mean ±
1 standard deviation (dotted line) of 33 and 14 maintenance period in the pre-crisis and crisis
period, respectively, are plotted.52
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Figure 9: Fine Tuning Operation (FTO) and accumulated reserve surplus on the last day of
the maintenance period in the pre-crisis period. The OLS regression gives a ˆ a = −0.01741
(−0.00326) and ˆ b =1 .05912 (0.597753) with t-values equal to −4.679 and 14.229 (−0.140 and
4.897) , respectively. R2 is 0.8747 (0.6665) for the pre-crisis (crisis) period.53
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1247
October 2010
Table 1: Summary statistics cuac
j
t between
March 2003 and July 2007
Mean Std. Skew. Kurt. ACF(1)
all
Mean 100.52 52.96 2.03 21.36 0.37
Std. 2.10 25.63 2.64 52.61 0.16
Min. 95.11 0.96 -0.47 2.88 0.03
25% 100.00 36.62 0.77 4.83 0.26
50% 100.07 48.77 1.20 6.95 0.38
75% 100.19 65.75 1.96 12.34 0.48
Max. 113.58 153.98 17.29 407.10 0.86
large
Mean 99.96 51.81 1.37 11.09 0.35
Std. 0.79 18.77 1.46 23.01 0.13
Min. 95.11 22.06 0.25 2.88 0.08
25% 99.99 41.49 0.74 4.62 0.25
50% 100.02 44.79 1.02 5.84 0.35
75% 100.11 64.52 1.36 7.91 0.44
Max. 101.76 105.54 9.33 156.88 0.58
medium
Mean 100.68 61.81 2.62 23.62 0.33
Std. 1.26 29.55 2.06 24.81 0.17
Min. 99.12 29.98 -0.47 3.98 0.03
25% 100.02 34.89 0.97 6.31 0.24
50% 100.10 57.79 1.85 11.87 0.33
75% 101.07 77.42 3.50 26.34 0.45
Max. 103.56 131.71 6.94 81.87 0.67
small
Mean 102.52 46.42 3.89 58.77 0.54
Std. 4.34 40.19 5.09 115.70 0.18
Min. 99.65 0.96 -0.39 3.12 0.13
25% 100.04 17.83 0.54 8.75 0.45
50% 100.38 48.19 2.02 11.70 0.53
75% 102.98 55.77 4.45 36.20 0.64
Max. 113.58 153.98 17.29 407.10 0.86
Estimates are based on individual bank data
covering the period March 2003 to July 2007.
Table 2: Kaplan-Meier estimate of survival function S( )t





all large medium small all large medium small
t=T-4 72.2 (0.8) 81.8 (0.8) 46.0 (1.9) 67.5 (2.0) 77.1 (0.7) 85.5 (0.8) 56.2 (1.9) 70.7 (2.0)
t=T-3 65.5 (0.8) 74.3 (1.0) 40.9 (1.9) 61.8 (2.1) 70.9 (0.8) 78.7 (0.9) 51.0 (1.9) 65.5 (2.0)
t=T-2 58.2 (0.9) 64.6 (1.0) 37.6 (1.9) 58.7 (2.1) 63.9 (0.8) 70.3 (1.0) 46.9 (1.9) 60.5 (2.1)
weekend 46.8 (0.9) 50.0 (1.1) 30.0 (1.8) 55.2 (2.1) 52.9 (0.9) 57.1 (1.1) 36.9 (1.9) 56.6 (2.1)
weekend 26.8 (0.8) 24.5 (0.9) 14.5 (1.4) 51.1 (2.1) 30.6 (0.8) 28.6 (1.0) 19.9 (1.5) 51.5 (2.1)
t=T-1 9.2 (0.5) 5.0 (0.5) 2.1 (0.6) 34.5 (2.0) 11.2 (0.5) 6.2 (0.5) 7.8 (1.0) 34.5 (2.0)
t=T 0.4 (0.1) 0.4 (0.1) 0.3 (0.2) 0.4 (0.3) 0.8 (0.2) 0.7 (0.2) 1.3 (0.4) 0.6 (0.3)
The survival function S( )t gives the probability that up to time t there is no lock-in. The Table plots
the last 4 busness days plus the last weekend of the maintenance period for period March 2003 to July







































































t) <  ) diﬀerentiated according to
bank size plotted over the last 20 days of the maintenance period. The survival function S( )t
gives the average fraction of banks which are not locked-in on day t. We consider two thresholds
for the regime switch:   = 0 and   equal to the probability of an overdraft P(bt −at). Estimates
are based on individual banks’ current accounts cuac
j
t = at−bt+λtj covering the period March
2003 to July 2007.55
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Table 3: Comparison of Euclidean Distance between simulated and observed average EONIA and
liquidity characteristics during the last 5 days in the maintenance period.
s=60 s=20
σ =3 0 σ =4 5 σ =5 0 σ =3 0 σ =4 5 σ =5 0
EONIA Spread
Pre-Crisis (Frontloading = 7.76) 12.10 2.85 4.18 7.46 8.86 9.62
Crisis (Frontloading = 7.5) 30.90 12.50 4.62 6.23 5.33 5.98
Crisis (Frontloading = 7.5) + Agg. Shock μ = −0.5 18.43 3.30 5.81 4.79 6.68 9.22
Crisis (Frontloading = 7.5) + Lending constraint l=0.97 24.41 4.11 6.32 5.11 3.15 7.21
Crisis (Frontloading = 7.5) + Lending constraint l=0.99 29.11 9.80 3.22 6.49 3.14 3.95
EONIA MTM-Variation
Pre-Crisis (Frontloading = 7.76) 8.66 7.65 7.04 8.52 6.36 5.33
Crisis (Frontloading = 7.5) 11.60 10.01 9.74 5.34 2.88 2.48
Crisis (Frontloading = 7.5) + Agg. Shock μ = −0.5 11.02 10.03 9.98 5.03 3.01 2.75
Crisis (Frontloading = 7.5) + Lending constraint l=0.97 11.16 9.82 9.47 8.99 6.62 5.49
Crisis (Frontloading = 7.5) + Lending constraint l=0.99 11.64 9.97 9.83 8.92 6.27 5.05
EONIA spread Shape
Pre-Crisis (Frontloading = 7.76) 2.24 2.00 2.24 3.61 3.46 2.83
Crisis (Frontloading = 7.5) 2.24 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00 0.00
Crisis (Frontloading = 7.5) + Agg. Shock μ = −0.5 2.83 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00 0.00
Crisis (Frontloading = 7.5) + Lending constraint l=0.97 1.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 0.00
Crisis (Frontloading = 7.5) + Lending constraint l=0.99 1.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 0.00
Deﬁciency - FTO - Current Account
Pre-Crisis (Frontloading = 7.76) 4.92 4.39 6.18 4.63 4.83 7.38
Crisis (Frontloading = 7.5) 10.71 7.50 7.46 10.04 6.76 7.54
Crisis (Frontloading = 7.5) + Agg. Shock μ = −0.5 5.07 4.07 6.14 4.58 4.66 7.60
Crisis (Frontloading = 7.5) + Lending constraint l=0.97 8.71 5.63 6.64 8.19 5.43 7.51
Crisis (Frontloading = 7.5) + Lending constraint l=0.99 10.02 6.77 7.03 9.40 6.21 7.39
Comparison of observed and simulated EONIA spread, maintainance-period-to-maintenance-period (MTM)
variation, EONIA spread shape and liquidity situation for diﬀerent idiosyncratic shock volatilities
σ = {30,45,50} for diﬀerent pre-crisis and crisis period scenarios. The pre-crisis period is modeled with
frontloading of FL=7 .8 and without market frictions (s = 60) and with market segmentation s = 20. The
crisis period is charactersized by frontloading of FL=7 .5. The crisis period scenarios consist of combinations
of aggregate liquidity shock μ = {−0.5,0}, lending constraint l = {0.97,0.99,1} and degree of market
segmentation s = {20,60}. For the EONIA spread shape the (unweighted) Euclidian distance of signs of
spread changes is calculated. For the other characteristics a weighted Euclidian distance is given which is
obtained such that the ﬁgures in regime 1 (’WED’, ’TUE’, ’FRI’) have in total a weight of 0.5 and the ﬁgures
in regime 2 (’MON’, ’TUE’) also have a weight of 0.5. The minimum value of a row is plotted in bold face56
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Table 4: Summary statistics Δcuac
j
t
Mean Std. Skew. Kurt. JB p-val. ACF(1)
(%)
all
Mean -0.01 40.75 -0.02 -0.20 0.31 -0.32
Std. 1.67 18.81 0.11 0.42 0.27 0.08
Min. -3.77 6.38 -0.35 -0.81 0.00 -0.46
25% -0.81 29.64 -0.08 -0.42 0.08 -0.38
50% 0.11 38.79 -0.02 -0.32 0.24 -0.34
75% 0.80 50.67 0.05 -0.16 0.53 -0.29
Max. 6.42 96.08 0.27 1.69 0.95 -0.07
large
Mean 0.08 42.81 -0.01 -0.32 0.31 -0.34
Std. 1.61 16.65 0.09 0.23 0.26 0.06
Min. -3.04 12.85 -0.16 -0.81 0.02 -0.46
25% -0.81 31.28 -0.08 -0.44 0.10 -0.37
50% 0.19 41.98 -0.01 -0.35 0.24 -0.34
75% 0.86 51.71 0.05 -0.24 0.50 -0.30
Max. 6.42 96.08 0.27 0.58 0.95 -0.20
medium
Mean -0.21 39.95 -0.00 -0.03 0.26 -0.32
Std. 1.70 20.09 0.13 0.61 0.25 0.08
Min. -3.77 7.60 -0.34 -0.47 0.00 -0.44
25% -0.70 29.15 -0.07 -0.37 0.08 -0.39
50% 0.06 37.72 -0.01 -0.33 0.20 -0.31
75% 0.66 42.52 0.06 -0.06 0.32 -0.28
Max. 3.04 86.01 0.20 1.69 0.70 -0.16
small
Mean -0.12 29.71 -0.12 0.15 0.41 -0.25
Std. 2.11 26.54 0.13 0.60 0.37 0.12
Min. -2.57 6.38 -0.35 -0.57 0.00 -0.39
25% -1.45 8.65 -0.19 -0.15 0.03 -0.35
50% -0.14 18.41 -0.09 -0.09 0.44 -0.27
75% 0.72 46.02 -0.03 0.32 0.70 -0.17
Max. 3.92 70.70 0.04 1.31 0.90 -0.07
The residuals are obtained by the time-series regression
Δcuac
i





where ΔMROt,Δ LTROt and Δcuac
i
t are the daily absolute
changes of the MRO, LTRO and the i-th bank end-of-day
current account.
Table 5: GMM estimation results based on Δcuac
j
t
no market segmentation s=n market segmentation s=0.1n
Estimate Std.Error p value Estimate Std.Error p value
(%)
Parameters
σλ,large 41.9620 8.6418 0.0000 40.8371 7.9070 0.0000
σλ,medium 38.3416 9.6320 0.0001 37.1130 8.8864 0.0000
σλ,small 36.1516 10.4117 0.0005 34.8489 9.6815 0.0003
β 0.4813 0.1155 0.0000 0.5009 0.1160 0.0000
σ  2.9855 90.3352 0.9736 7.1794 34.2771 0.8341
J-test
statistic 0.0011 0.0017
p value 0.9735 0.967658
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(a) Crisis Obs. Front-loading FTO











(b) Crisis Obs. Front-loading RB











(c) Crisis No Front-loading FTO











(d) Crisis No Front-loading RB
Figure 12: Comparison of diﬀerent front-loading policies and end-of-maintenance period policies
(ﬁne-tuning operation FTO, reserve band system RB) for a interest rate corridor of il−id = 2%.
Diﬀerent scenarios for front-loading policy: high frontloading (DT−8=700), observed frontload-
ing (DT−8=723.5), low front-loading (DT−8=750) and no front-loading (DT−8=807) are calcu-
lated for the crisis period where the starting current accounts were set to AT−8 =9 6 .5. The
lending constraints were assumed to be l =0 .97 and market segmentation was set to s = 20.
Liquidity shocks were assume to have zero mean μ = 0 and a standard deviation of σ = 45.
The ﬁne-tuning-operation (FTO) policy was assumed to target an aggregate surplus of S =1 2
(f = S + DT − AT) . The reserve band policy assume a reserve band of rb = 28.59
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Table 6: Policy Comparison based on simulations of 1000 maintenance periods
iT − MBR St.dev it Bid-ask Spread
Avg. Diﬀ. Avg. Diﬀ. Avg. Diﬀ.
Obs. Frontloading and FTO 0.7 10.4*** 2.7***
Obs. Frontloading and RB -1.7 -2.4*** 9.4*** -1.0*** 2.6*** -0.1***
No Frontloading and FTO 23.3*** 22.7*** 11.2*** 0.8** 3.3*** 0.7***
No Frontloading and RB 38.7*** 38.0*** 11.7*** 1.3*** 4.0*** 1.2***
Tot. Liq. Prov. Liq. Prov. t=T Avg. Trading
Avg. Diﬀ. Avg. Diﬀ. Avg. Diﬀ.
Obs. Frontloading and FTO 45.5*** -3.0*** 113.2***
Obs. Frontloading and RB 45.2*** -0.3*** -3.3*** -0.3*** 114.1*** 0.9***
No Frontloading and FTO 61.0*** 15.4*** 61.0*** 64.0*** 109.1*** -4.1***
No Frontloading and RB 61.0*** 15.7*** 61.0*** 63.8*** 104.2*** -9.0***
Simulation of 1000 maintenance periods for comparison of open market operation policies.
Quality criteria: average EONIA spread iT − MBR, the bid-ask spreadT due to lending
constraints and the time-series standard deviation of the EONIA over the last 5 days is given in
bps; liquidity provision ’Tot.Liq.Prov’ is calculated as amount of front-loading plus liquidity
absorbtion or provision on t = T (’Liq.Prov t=T’) as percentage of the minimum reserve
requirements (MRR); the average trading volume is calculated over the last two days in regime
II (as the trading volume is the same for all policies in regime I) and also given in percent of the
MRR. Two diﬀerent scenarios for the ECB’s frontloading policy are considered: observed
frontloading (DT−8=723.5) and no front-loading (DT−8=807)) are calculated for the crisis
period where the starting values for current accounts were set to AT−8 =9 6 .5. The lending
constraints were assumed to be l =0 .97 and market segmentation was set to s = 20. Liquidity
shocks were assume to have zero mean μ = 0 and a standard deviation of σ = 45. The
ﬁne-tuning-operation (FTO) policy was assumed to target an aggregate surplus of S = 12 . The
reserve band policy (RB) assume a reserve band of rb = 28. For each quality measure the
average (’Avg.’) over 1000 simulation and the diﬀerence (’Diﬀ.’) of each policy to the policy of
’Obs. Frontloading and FTO’ is reported. For each reported ﬁgure we test for signiﬁcant
diﬀerence from zero: *** 1%, ** 5% signiﬁcance level.Working PaPer SerieS
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